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Abstract
The impact of combinations of frictions on investment activity is poorly understood. We
develop a model of investment under financial frictions and irreversibility. We show that the
possibility of encountering financial constraints in future raises irreversible investment today
over that arising under irreversibility alone. By contrast, investment under both frictions is
lower than under future financial constraints alone.
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1. Introduction 
We contribute to the literature analysing the effects of irreversibility and 
financial constraints in conjunction on investment. Under irreversibility alone, and 
with the option to wait for uncertainty to be resolved, a firm reduces investment 
today, compared to the frictionless case, to avoid holding too much capital in future. 
We show that the possibility of encountering financial constraints in the future may 
accelerate current irreversible investment over that arising under irreversibility alone. 
This rush to invest effect arises as firms try to take advantage of benign conditions 
today to avoid having too little capital in future. Under this effect investment exceeds 
that under irreversibility alone but remains lower than in the frictionless case. We 
consider firms’ investment decisions, but similar issues may be present in durable 
goods expenditures, human capital accumulation, labour demand and elsewhere. 
 
The literature on irreversible investment is one response to the empirical 
failure of the (frictionless and convex adjustment cost versions of) the neoclassical 
investment model, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Smit and Trigeorgis (2004). It may 
account for the history dependence of investment decisions, periods of inaction, and 
the predominance of quantity over price variables in investment equations. The 
presence of financial imperfections offers a competing explanation of observed 
investment dynamics, see Hubbard (1998). Only recently has work begun to examine 
the nature of the interaction between both frictions and the consequences for 
investment dynamics. Holt (2003) examines how firms’ investment and dividend 
policies interact under irreversibility and financial constraints. He emphasises the life-
cycle nature of the resultant optimal policies in which small (young) firms invest, and 
grow relaxing financial frictions before beginning to pay dividends. Bayer (2006) 
finds nonlinear patterns of short-run investment in UK firm level data which are 
consistent with a model in which firms face non-convex adjustment costs and 
financial frictions. Caggese (2007) studies investment under irreversibility and 
financial constraints when the firm uses irreversible, fixed capital and perfectly-
flexible variable capital as complements in production. He shows that investing in 
fixed capital today exacerbates the impact of (future) financial constraints on variable 
capital. So the complementarity of fixed and variable capital in production leads to a 
precautionary effect of future financial constraints in his model which retards fixed 
capital investment beyond the effect of irreversibility alone. 
 
The rush to invest effect which we highlight here has not been analysed in 
existing work. Our analysis corresponds to an environment where either the 
production complementarities studied by Caggese (2007) are absent, or where other 
factors of production are also subject to non-convex costs of adjustment rather than 
being freely adjustable. The effect we study arises because the possibility of being 
unable to expand capacity in future, due to financial constraints, raises the cost of 
waiting for the resolution of uncertainty, which partly offsets the value of the option 
to wait that arises under irreversibility. The combination of irreversibility and 
financial constraints raises current investment when compared with the effect of 
irreversibility alone. It tends to retard investment compared to a situation with 
financial constraints alone. We show that concerns over being financially constrained 
in future do not lead investment to exceed that in the frictionless case. Finally, 
increased uncertainty may raise investment in our model whereas it tends to reduce 
investment under irreversibility alone. 2 
2. A Model of Optimal Capacity Choice 
 
We extend the two period framework of Abel et al. (1996) to allow for present 
and future financial constraints. This enables us to characterise behaviour without 
relying on numerical analysis.
1 We first outline the basic framework and then 
characterise optimal investment in various environments: without frictions, under 
irreversibility alone, under financial constraints alone and under both constraints 
together. Unless otherwise indicated, proofs are in the appendix. 
 
Suppose that a firm exists for two periods, possibly of different lengths. The 
firm initially holds no capital. It makes two investment decisions: how much capital to 
acquire today, 1 K , and how much additional capital to acquire next period,  1 2 K K − . 
Investment becomes productive immediately. Capital does not depreciate between 
period 1 and 2, but there is 100% depreciation at the end of period 2. There are no 
other factors of production. The firm obtains revenues  ( ) 1 K r  in period 1. We assume 
that  () 0 0 = r ,  ( ) 0 1 > ′ K r  and  ( ) 0 1 < ′ ′ K r  for  0 1 > K , due to either diminishing 
marginal product of capital or a downward sloping product demand function. There is 
uncertainty over the profitability of capital in period 2. We write revenues as 
() e K R , 2 , where  0 2 ≥ K and  e, ∞ < < ∞ − e , is a random variable with distribution 
function  () e G , which captures all uncertainty affecting the profitability of the firm. 
Future capital,  2 K ,  is chosen after the realisation of e. Assume  () e K R , 2  is twice 
continuously differentiable in both arguments. Period 2 marginal revenue product of 
capital is positive, () 0 , 2 > e K RK , strictly decreasing in K ,  ( ) 0 , 2 < e K RKK and strictly 
increasing in e,  () 0 , 2 > e K RKe . The unit cost, P , of acquiring new capital remains 
constant over time. The firm chooses  1 K  and  2 K so as to maximise expected 
discounted profits, where  0 > β  is its discount factor. 
 
As our primary aim is to characterise the consequences of irreversibility and 
financial constraints, rather than to model how these constraints originate, we take the 
financial constraint and the irreversibility constraint as exogenously given.
2 
Irreversibility of investment requires  0 1 ≥ K  and  ( ) 0 1 2 ≥ − K e K . To capture financial 
constraints let the firm hold wealth,  0 1 > W  at the start of period 1, but suppose it is 
unable to raise external finance. This constraint requires  0 1 1 ≥ ⋅ − K P W  in period 1 
and  [] 0 1 2 2 ≥ − − K K P W  in period 2, where  () [ ] 1 1 1 2 K r PK W W + − = , and, for 
simplicity, the firm earns no interest on internal wealth.  
 
2.1 Optimal Capacity without Frictions.  
 
To establish a benchmark consider the frictionless case. In the absence 
frictions, the firm adjusts date 2 capital until  ( ) ( ) P e e K RK = , 2 . This determines  2 K  as 
                                                 
1 Our 2-period set up offers a simple treatment of the presence and resolution of uncertainty, current 
and future financial constraints and the outcomes across different combinations of constraints.  
2 This approach is standard in the literature on irreversibility in investment, Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
We recognise that informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers in financial relationships, 
or between seller and purchaser in the secondary market for capital equipment, or limited commitment 
may underpin financial and irreversibility constraints. Our approach not only has the virtue of 
simplicity but also seems well suited to the objectives of the paper. 3 
a function of e. Let  () () ( ) ()( ) [] {} ( ) ∫
∞
∞ − − − + = e dG K e K P e e K R K r K V
N
1 2 2 1 1 , β  be the 
value of capital installed at date 1. The firm solves:  ( ) 1 1
1
max K P K V
N
K ⋅ − . Let 
N K1  be 
the optimal capital stock in the frictionless case. The first order condition is: 
 
  ()() P P K r K V
N N N = + ′ =
′
β 1 1 .            ( 1 )  
 
2.2 Optimal Capacity under Irreversible Investment. 
 
Due to the irreversibility constraint, the firm must hold date 2 capital stock 
1 2 K K ≥ . For any initial capital  1 K , there exists a threshold value of  I e e = , 
() ( ) () P e e K R e K R I I K I K = = , , 2 1 , where for  I e e ≤ , 1 2 K K =  and for  I e e >  ,  () e K2  is 
determined by the first order condition  ( ) ( ) P e e K RK = , 2 . Let the date 1 value of 
installed capital under irreversibility be: 
() () ( )( ) ( ) ()( ) [] {} ( ) ∫ ∫
∞




e I e dG K e K P e e K R e dG e K R K r K V 1 2 2 1 1 1 , , β β . The 
firm solves the problem,  ( ) 1 1
1
max K P K V
I
K ⋅ − , to determine the optimal  period 1 
capital, 
I K1  (with associated threshold 
I
I e ).
3 The first order condition is: 
 




I I I = + − + ′ =
′
∫ ∞ − β β , 1 1 1 .    (2) 
 
Lemma 1: 
N I K K 1 1 < : date 1 capital is lower under an irreversibility constraint than 
in the frictionless case.
4 
 
Here, the loss in marginal revenue associated with holding too much capital in the 
future, due to irreversibility, leads the firm reduce investment today. 
 
2.3 Optimal Capacity Choice under Irreversibility and Financial Constraints  
 
With financial constraints the maximum capital stock that can be held on date 
2 is  () ( ) [] P K r PK W K K K 1 1 1 1 1 2 + − + = . Lemma 2 shows results about  () 1 2 K K . 
 
Lemma 2 a)  () 1 1 2 K K K > ,  [ ] P W K 1 1 , 0 ∈ ∀ ;  b)  ( ) () 0 , 1 1 2 < = > dK K dK as 
()
N K K 1 1 ,> = < ; c)  () ( ) 0
2
1 1 2
2 < dK K K d . 
 
For arbitrary capital stock,  1 K , and wealth level,  1 W , there are two threshold 
values of e:  I e  and  F e , which are defined by the conditions  
 
() ( ) () P e e K R e K R I I K I K = = , , 2 1   ,        ( 3 )  
                                                 
3 The associated threshold value of e  is 
I
I e , where the subscript denotes a threshold associated with 
irreversibility and the superscript denotes that threshold associated with optimal capital stock under 
irreversibility, 
I K1 . This approach to notation for thresholds is used throughout. 
4 Proofs of statements are contained in the appendix unless otherwise indicated. 4 
 
() () ( ) () P e e K R e K K R F F K F K = = , , 2 1 2 .         ( 4 )  
 
Now  I F e e > , since  ( ) 0 1 1 2 > − K K K  by Lemma 2, while  () 0 , < ⋅ ⋅ KK R   and 
() 0 , > ⋅ ⋅ Ke R  by assumption. So period 2 is characterised by 3 regimes. For  I e e <  the 
firm’s best response is inaction, so the irreversibility constraint binds and the marginal 
revenue product of irreversibly held period 1 capital lies below that of the optimally 
chosen frictionless period 2 capital,  ( ) ( ) ( ) P e e K R e K R K K = < , , 2 1 . For  F e e >  the 
firm’s best response is constrained investment, as the financial constraint binds and 
the marginal revenue product of capital under financial constraints  exceeds that in the 
absence of financial frictions:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) P e e K R e K K R K K = > , , 2 1 2 . For intermediate 
values  [] F I e e e , ∈  neither constraint binds and capital stock attains the same value as 
in the frictionless case: () () P e e K RK = , 2 . These regimes exist regardless of whether 
the financial constraint also binds in period 1, but the threshold locations depend on 
the capital stock and wealth inherited from period 1.  Hence, the date 1 value of the 
firm’s capital is: 
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          On date 1, the firm solves the problem:  ( ) [] 1 1 1
1
max K P W K P K V
FI
K ⋅ − + ⋅ − λ . 
The condition  [ ] 0 1 ≥ ⋅ − K P W λ  holds with complementary slackness. When the 
financial constraint does not bind in period 1,  1 1 K P W ⋅ > ,  0 = λ . Then:  
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1 1  (5) 
 
where 
FI K1  is the optimal date 1 capital stock and 
FI
I e , 
FI
F e  are the associated 
thresholds (for irreversibility and financial constraints respectively). If the financial 
constraint does bind in period 1, then  0 > λ . Let 
FI K1  be the optimal date 1 capital 
given the binding constraint, then 
FI K P W 1 ⋅ = . The first order condition in that case 
is a modified version of equation (5) in which 
FI FI K K 1 1 =  and  ( ) [] λ + =
′
1 1 P K V
FI FI . 
 
Next, define the derivative of 
FI V  evaluated for arbitrary 
*
1 1 K K =  as   
() () ( ) [] ()
() () () [ ] () () () P e dG P e K K R
dK
dK
e dG P e K R K r K J

























* *, F I e e  are the threshold values for equations (3) and (4) associated with 
*
1 K . 
Lemma 3 develops a useful intermediate result on the monotonicity of  ( )
*
1 K J  in 
*
1 K .  
 
Lemma 3. For  ∈
*
1 K (




1 < ∂ ∂ K K J . 5 
 
Our main result summarises the effect of financial constraints, present and 
future, on irreversible investment. 
 
Proposition 1: a) For  0 = λ , 
N FI I K K K 1 1 1 < < . b) For  0 > λ   i)
FI FI K K 1 1 < ,  ii) 
()
I FI K K 1 1 ,< = >  as  () () () P K V K J
I I I λ > = <
′
− , 1 1 . 
 
Proof: a) First we show that 
FI I K K 1 1 < , by contradiction. Suppose that 
FI I K K 1 1 = , 




I e e = . Yet, at 
I K K 1
*




I I K V K J 1
*






I I I e dG P e K K R dK dK K V K J , 1 2 1 2 1 1 . The 
integral is positive. Lemma 1 guarantees that 
N I K K 1 1 < , so from Lemma 2 
() 0 1 1 2 > dK K dK . Thus  () ( ) 0 1 1 >
′
−
I I I K V K J  and we must have 
FI I K K 1 1 ≠ . From 










− ∂ K J K K V K J
I I  so 
FI I K K 1 1 < . Next we show that 
N FI K K 1 1 <  using a similar approach. Suppose that 
N FI K K 1 1 = , then, evaluated at 
N K K 1
*
1 = ,  () ( )








1 1 1 < − =
′
− ∫ ∞ −
N N
I K e N
K
N I N e dG P e K R K V K J β . So 
we must have 










− ∂ K J K K V K J
N N , from 
Lemma 3, it follows that 
N FI K K 1 1 < . 
b) i) For 
FI K K 1
*
1 = ,  () ( ) ( )( )






− λ  and 










− ∂ K J K K V K J
FI FI . So it follows that 
FI FI K K 1 1 < . 
ii)  For 
I K K 1
*









, 1 2 1 2 1 1 . 
Since
N I K K 1 1 < , Lemma 2 ensures that  ( ) 0 1 1 2 > dK K dK . Also, the integral term is 
positive so it follows that  ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 >
′
−











− ∂ K J K K V K J
I I  and  ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 > = − P K V K V
FI FI FI FI λ . So   
()
I FI K K 1 1 ,< = >  as  () () () P K V K J
I I I λ > = <
′
− , 1 1 .  
 
Result a) shows that if a firm does not face financial constraints today and its 
investment decisions are irreversible, the possibility of encountering financial 
constraints in the future raises current investment over that arising under 
irreversibility alone.
 5 The firm takes advantage of benign conditions to guard against 
the possibility of having too little capital in future. The possibility of being financially 
constrained in future raises the cost of waiting which partly offsets the value of the 
option to wait that arises under irreversibility. Yet while this rush to invest may 
attenuate the effect of irreversibility it does not override it. This follows because 
investment does not exceed that in the frictionless case, even without the 
                                                 
5 Under irreversibility alone, 
N I K K 1 1 < . At this point  ( ) 0 1 1 2 > dK K dK  so the possibility of future 
financial constraints financial constraints raises optimal period 1 investment to 
I FI K K 1 1 > . 6 
complementarities in production assumed in Caggese (2007). Result b) shows that 
when a firm currently faces financial constraints and its investment decisions are 
irreversible, the rush to invest effect is still present but may be outweighed by the 
other constraints affecting the firm. Results b) i) and b) ii) show that currently binding 
financial constraints reduce investment compared with result a). 
 
Finally, consider the effects of uncertainty over the future as captured by a 
mean-preserving spread in the distribution function:  ( ) e G  to  ( ) e G
~
 in equation (5). 
This raises the mass in the tails of the profitability shock distribution which increases  







FI e dG P e K K R dK dK , 1 2 1 2 β  and makes  ( ) [ ] () ∫ ∞ − −
FI
I e FI
K e dG P e K R , 1 β  more 
negative. This second integral represents the loss in marginal revenue associated with 
holding too much capital in the future, due to irreversibility. This leads the firm to 
reduce investment today, exploiting the option to wait. However, a firm must balance 
this consideration against the possibility that by acquiring too little capital today, it 
fails to generate sufficient internal funds to take advantage of high future profitability 







FI e dG P e K K R dK dK , 1 2 1 2 β . Depending on 
the locations of the thresholds and the shape of the distribution function for 
profitability, a rise in uncertainty may lead to a rise in investment today by increasing 
the latter rush to invest effect more than the former option to wait. However the model 
would also be consistent with empirical evidence of a negative effect of uncertainty 
on investment, Carruth et al. (2000). 
 
2.4 Optimal Capacity Choice Under Financial Constraints  
 
To shed further light on the interaction of irreversibility with financial 
constraints, we contrast the results of Proposition 1 with those arising in an 
environment where financial constraints may bind at present or in the future but 
investment is reversible. For arbitrary capital stock,  1 K , and wealth level,  1 W , 
equation (4) defines a threshold value of e,  F e , such that for  F e e >  the financial 
constraint binds and the marginal revenue product of capital is 
() ()( ) () P e e K R e K K R K K = > , , 2 1 2 . The date 1 value of capital installed is:  
 
() ()
() ()( ) [] {} ( )






















e dG K K K P e K K R
e dG K e K P e e K R
K r K V







On date 1, the firm solves the problem:  ( ) [ ] 1 1 1
1
max K P W K P K V
F
K ⋅ − + ⋅ − λ  and the 
condition  [] 0 1 ≥ ⋅ − K P W λ  holds with complementary slackness. When  0 = λ  the 
financial constraint does not bind in period 1 and the first order condition is 
() () () () [] () P P e dG P e K K R
dK
dK









β β , 1 2
1
2
1 1 , where 
F K1  is the 
optimal capital stock. Let 
F K1  denote the optimal capital stock when  0 > λ  so 
()() λ + =
′
1 1 P K V
F F . Implications for capital choice are captured in Proposition 2. 
 7 
Proposition 2: a) For   0 = λ , 
N F K K 1 1 = . b) For  0 > λ , 
N F K K 1 1 < . 
 
Part a. indicates that when financial constraints may bind in future, but do not 
bind today, it is optimal invest until capital stock is at its frictionless level. Notice that 
with this level of capital stock, there remains some possibility that investment will be 
financially constrained at date 2. This is optimal because holding too much capital, 
i.e. 
N F K K 1 1 > , reduces both the marginal revenue product of capital today and the 
value of wealth next period. This contrasts with the situation described in Proposition 
1. There the possibility of future financial constraints raises capital stock above that 
observed under pure irreversibility but leaves it below the frictionless level. Although 
wealth is an increasing function of capital at that point, the firm does not hold as 
much capital as in the frictionless case. It balances the impact on marginal revenue of 
being financially constrained when   F e e >  (through having too little capital ex post) 
against the impact on marginal revenue of being irreversibility constrained when 
I e e <  (through holding too much capital ex post).  
 
3 Implications for Empirical Work 
 
Our results highlight contrasting implications of the introduction of 
irreversibility and financial constraints. Comparison of Propositions 1 & 2 suggests 
that the introduction of irreversibility slows investment under financial constraints,  
because with both constraints, investment remains lower than in the frictionless case. 
Meanwhile, Proposition 1 says that the possibility of future financial constraints may 
raise investment under both frictions above that observed under irreversibility alone. 
This also contrasts the impact of future financial constraints, with that of current 
financial constraints, which lower investment. 
 
These implications may be helpful in assessing the relative contribution of these 
frictions to investment behaviour in greater detail than heretofore. However, studies 
of irreversibility in investment which fail to control for financial constraints may be 
compromised by incorrectly ascribing to irreversibility, or to the combination of both 
frictions, an effect that is really due to financial constraints alone. In particular, when 
financial constraints do not bind today but may do so in future, the effect of 
irreversibility may be attenuated (Proposition 1) and may thus be difficult to detect, 
while when financial constraints do bind today, they alone produce an effect with the 
same sign as that of irreversibility alone (Lemma 1, Propositions 1 and 2). Finally, 
since irreversibility exacerbates the effect of (current) financial constraints, it may be 
important to control for the effect of the former friction when assessing the impact of 




We developed a model of investment under financial frictions and 
irreversibility. The possibility of encountering financial constraints in the future raises 
current investment over that arising under irreversibility alone. Investment remains 
lower than in the frictionless case. These results cast doubt on empirical work on the 
effects of irreversibility that does not control for financial frictions, and suggest how 
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Proof of Lemma 1 Notice that in equation (2)  ( ) [ ] () 0 , 1 < − ∫ ∞ −
I
I e I
K e dG P e K R β , since 








K = = , , 2 1  and  ( ) 0 , > ⋅ ⋅ Ke R . Comparison of equations (1) and 
(2) shows that we must have  ( ) ( )
N I K r K r 1 1 ′ > ′ , so 
N I K K 1 1 <  as required.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 a) From the date 1 financial constraint  0 1 1 ≥ ⋅ − K P W . Now 
0 1 > W  by assumption and  ( ) 0 1 > K r  for  0 1 > K . So   ()0 1 1 1 > + − K r PK W , 
[] P W K 1 1 , 0 ∈ ∀  and  () 1 1 2 K K K > . 
b)   () () [] P P P K r dK K dK − + ′ = β 1 1 1 2 . Now  ( ) 0 1 > ′ K r  is decreasing in  1 K  and 
from equation (1)  ( ) 0 1 = − + ′ P P K r
N β  so the desired result follows. 
c)  () ( ) () 0 1
2
1 1 2
2 < ′ ′ = P K r dK K K d .  
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Proof of Lemma 3:   
       
() ( )
() () () () [] () ()
()
() [] () () () () ()






























































































K K e g P K K e K K R
e dG e K R
dK
dK






















For any thresholds  ( )
*
1
* K eI ,  ( ) ( )
*
1 2




1 , a n d  









() () [] () () ()


























































K K e KK






e dG e K K R
dK
dK
e dG P e K K R
dK
K d






Now  () 0 < ⋅ ′ ′ r  and  () 0 , < ⋅ ⋅ KK R  so the first and second terms are negative for  0
*
1 > K . 
For the third term  ( ) ( ) P e K K RK > ,
*
1 2  for  ( ) ( )
*
1 2
* K K e e F > , so the integral is positive. 





2 < ′ ′ = P K r dK K d from Lemma 2. So the third term is negative. 
For the final term, the integral is negative, while ( )
2 *
1 2 dK dK  is zero for 
N K K 1
*
1 =  
and positive otherwise. Therefore the final term is non-positive. As a consequence 
0
*
1 < ∂ ∂ K J.     
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
a)  () () ()() () () [ ] () ∫
∞








N F N N F F e dG P e K K R
dK
dK
K r K r K V K V , 1 2
1
2
1 1 1 1  . 
Notice that this expression equals 0 when 
N F K K 1 1 = , because  0
1
2 = F dK
dK
 by 
Lemma 2. By contrast if 
N F K K 1 1 <  then   ( ) ( )






Lemma 2, so  () ( ) 0 1 1 >
′
−
′ N N F F K V K V . While if 
N F K K 1 1 >  then   
( ) ( )





 b y  L e m m a  2 ,  s o   ( )( ) 0 1 1 >
′
<
′ N N F F K V K V . 
Therefore we have 
N F K K 1 1 = . 
b)  () ()()() () () [ ] () 0 , 1 2
1
2






P e dG P e K K R
K d
dK





N F N N F F λ
Now if 
N F F K K K 1 1 1 = = , then  ( ) ( ) P K V K V




0 1 1 , so 





 is decreasing in 
*
1 K  so we must have 
N F F K K K 1 1 1 = >   